Report from Colombia

We bring greetings to all from the churches in Colombia that have committed themselves to create a culture of peace. These are the churches that Justapaz, our UCC partner in Colombia, has been working with to support non-violent peace-building efforts to resolve the many conflicts in Colombia. The purpose of our visit, as part of an Ecumenical Delegation from six different Protestant churches in the United States, was to express our solidarity with Colombian churches that accept the call to follow Jesus in this risky and rewarding ministry of reconciliation.

In the first part of the report we will give a brief outline of the sources of the violence in Colombia and describe the three groups engaged in the armed struggle. Next we look at how churches are struggling to find an adequate response to the suffering and despair in their midst and to create conditions where peace initiatives can thrive. Finally in the last two sections we will look at some of the signs of hope for peace in Colombia and we will identify some obstacles in the path to peace, and we will offer some suggestions for smoothing out that path and providing sustenance and encouragement to those who travel an arduous journey.

Institutionalized Violence

Colombia's violent history has created the conditions that define the present armed conflict. From the time of the conquistadors and the slave based colonial rule of Spain, through the civil wars of the 19th century, which culminated in the War of a Thousand Days ending in 1902, to La Violencia (a nasty and sometimes brutal war between liberal and conservative political parties lasting from 1946 to 1958), armed conflict has left its scars. La Violencia was ended by an agreement to divide the legislative and bureaucratic positions equally and to alternate the presidency every four years. While this undemocratic agreement stopped the war, it didn't address the underlying inequities and injustices that continue to plague the country, and it led directly to the formation of a number of guerrilla movements by those who were now shut out of the remaining very limited political processes.

The success of the guerrilla movement, of which the FARC is the largest, is due to a number of reasons not the least of which is the imbalance in public sector development. The overemphasis on police and military has meant that other public services - schools, hospitals, roads, etc. are lacking, especially in rural areas. Only 23 of 100 school age children are attending school, for example. If you want to picture Colombia today, you might think of Europe in the middle ages: fortified hill-top towns, the centers of commerce and learning and governance surrounded by the countryside populated by sharecropper peasants living and working on the large estates of the landowners, and providing the manpower for defense. In addition to this European landscape, Colombia also has an American landscape, a vast frontier comprising almost half the country in the south and east that extends into the Amazon basin. This is an area that was for years beyond the reach of government, and beyond the interests of the landowning classes, so it provided an escape for those fleeing the violence or looking for a chance to make it on their own. Not surprisingly, it was in this area that the FARC sought refuge in the 1960s and over the years assumed more and more control over governmental structures. For similar reasons it is not surprising that when cocaine became a valuable commodity in the 1980s, it was first in this area that coca leaf production flourished, providing a source of "tax" revenue to the FARC that enabled it to assume some of the trappings of government and to effectively carry the war to other parts of the country.

Colombia's police and armed forces have been singularly ineffective in confronting and countering the guerrillas. At least two factors contributed to this situation. First, at the time of the political settlement of La Violencia a generous pension program was established for retired armed forces personnel. This had the effect of diverting much of Colombia's military spending away from those actively serving, adversely affecting their pay scales, training, and supplies and equipment. Second, the illicit drug trade controlled by the Cali and Medellín cartels during the 1970's and 80's has subverted the criminal justice system with payoffs to police and judges intended to block any effective prosecution of drug traffickers.

The escalation of violence in this most recent conflict in Colombia began in the mid 1980s when the guerrilla forces had obtained effective control over large areas where coca leaf was being produced and were able to "tax" its production. Now the FARC was a direct threat to the established Cali and Medellín drug cartels. The cartels and other large landowners joined forces in creating para-military units to secure their own territory and ensure that they could acquire coca paste at the lowest possible price by eliminating the competition. Very quickly this escalated into a very dirty war with the compesinos - peasant farmers - caught in the crossfire, victims of brutality and intimidation by both para-militaries and guerrillas as well as forced removal by the government.

Para-military forces now operate under a unified command and are known by the acronym, AUC. While the AUC command leadership is known and appears in public, relatively little is known about the identity of the members, sources of funding, and in particular their relationship with the regular armed forces - the army and police. Their strategy is to ruthlessly eliminate anyone suspected of collaboration with the guerrilla. Often their targets are gunned down or bombed in a setting that includes many innocent victims, apparently as a way of spreading terror and intimidating others from speaking out. Their targets include labor organizers, community leaders and others who would take up a cause against economic injustice in Colombia.

A spokesman for the Roman Catholic Church described the armed conflict in Colombia as an attack on civil society by all the armed groups. Over the past 10 years 3,000 people annually have been killed. 80% of the victims are civilians. Over 2.5 million people have been displaced from their homes. The war has affected Afro-Colombians disproportionately. Although they are 30% of the population, Afro-Colombians account for 65% of those who have been displaced by the armed conflict.

Indigenous people are also significantly affected by the conflict because their ancestral lands include strategically important areas - drug traffic routes and oil deposits that are areas of continual conflict and violence.

A member of the national legislature representing an area now controlled by the FARC, detailed for us the increasing victimization of the compesinos since the end of La Violenca. Small farmers were encouraged to move into the region during the 1960s and they experienced a succession of boom and bust years with a variety of agricultural products - rice, pigs, corn, and marijuana. At the same time coca production was gradually increasing without any interference until 1984 when Colombia declared war on narco-traffickers. In the years when the government had free access to the region, there was a very low level of enforcement and no assistance for those growing food crops. In 1990, when coca prices plummeted due to increased production in Peru and Bolivia the government proposed a crop substitution plan - growing yucca, rice, pigs, and cattle, etc. instead of coca. This had some success while coca prices were low, but when prices rose again farmers switched back to coca leaf because they needed the cash income to survive. In 1994 aerial fumigations were started, which led to a national protest by compesinos. The official response was that those who protested were to be moved off the land. The Attorney General of Colombia stated that the whole coca-growing region was a criminal conspiracy and needed to be cleaned out. "We are applying force because we are the institutionalized violence of the state. We are licensed to keep order in times of protest." The protest ended with an agreement that small holdings, less than 3 hectares, would be exempt from fumigations. Three days later the fumigations started again, and the agreement was abrogated. Whatever the effect of aerial fumigations on the health of the people, because herbicide affects both illicit crops and whatever food the families may be growing for their own use, the result is that the family is forced to move -- to a location deeper in the forest where they might escape detection, or to join another relative outside one of the cities where they can make a small living on the edges of the urban economy.

It is clear to us that it is compesinos, with little or no access to political power, who bear the brunt of the violence and the effects of the violence in Colombia.

None of the armed actors in the violence have legitimacy any longer: Government security forces - national police and the regular army - offer no protection to the civilian population or to the elected mayors of municipalities and other government officials in rural areas. The guerrillas routinely engage in kidnapping and extortion as a means of financing their armed struggle, and in response to then President-elect Uribe's hard line against the guerrillas, have issued death threats to mayors and other community leaders. The AUC forces target for execution labor organizers and other community leaders who could threaten their control over the more urbanized areas outside of Bogotá. Finally, there is credible evidence that there is widespread cooperation between the regular army and the paramilitary organizations that operate more or less openly in many of the regions, although the government maintains, with some plausibility, that the para-militaries are privately financed, and that the government forces are too few and too widely deployed to prevent the atrocities to civilians that are the earmark of paramilitary operations.

Peacemaking Initiatives

This is a critical time for Colombia. Over the past couple of years capital flight has doubled to slightly more than a billion dollars a year. One and a half million people have emigrated from Colombia in the past five years. People have lost trust in government authority. The peace process that recently ended with no agreement is entirely discredited. It appears now that neither government nor the guerrillas ever intended to engage in real negotiations; they were merely buying time, each side using the time to strengthen its military position. A new president has been elected with a pretty clear mandate to end the war and restore confidence in Colombia's future.

What is the hope for peace? Against the background of 150 years of war, the conclusion of any objective analysis has to be that the outlook for peace is pretty grim, at least in the sense of a lasting peace in which deep historical conflicts can finally be resolved. And yet, what other choice is there but to work for peace?

This is the conclusion that the Mennonites in Colombia came to 15 years ago when they founded Justapaz, a justice and peace ministry, dedicated to creating a culture of peace in Colombia through non-violent peacemaking initiatives that will restore justice and transform conflict into opportunities for building trust. Justapaz has alliances with closely related churches and has formed partnerships with others seeking to be faithful in the midst of the struggle. This is a calling that is not without risk. In the past ten years 35 to 40 pastors have been killed, 5,000 church families displaced, and 20 pastors kidnapped. Many churches are changing their theology in view of these experiences. Through CEDECOL, the Colombia Council of Protestant Churches, Justapaz has a voice in government circles.

The Catholic Church in Colombia is also responding to the crisis in important new ways and is uniquely positioned to speak with a common language of the Bible to all Christians - to civil authorities and to the guerrilla as well.

On our first full day in Colombia we attended a Church Consultation sponsored by Justapaz in which a number of pastors of CEDECOL member churches gave testimony about their experience doing ministry in rural areas. Here are some excerpts from what we heard:

From Cordoba, an area controlled by paramilitary forces: Until recently the church has been limited to helping people relate to God. But God tells me to work in this area with people who suffer - they need pastors to stay. I have a six-month old child and my wife cannot understand why we don't leave with the others who have been threatened. One of our pastors was killed while in the middle of a church service. Still, we are able to help people, even though our church is too small to give much support.

From Putumayo, an area disputed by the guerrilla and paramilitary: Four youth from my church are involved in the struggle; one has been killed, one is in a guerrilla unit, one in a paramilitary unit and one is in prison. In the last month the church was shot at and soon there will be a new offensive and more fumigations. The situation is getting worse; two pastors have recently left. We have no safe water and no electricity or telephones. For safety we sleep on the floor.

From San Vicente, until recently part of the FARC controlled demilitarized zone: When FARC was in control they built roads and bridges, but now the bridges are destroyed, and electricity has been on only 5 weeks in past 5 months. Town officials and pastors have been declared military targets and we were forced to leave the area. Twenty-three people have been killed including a Pentecostal pastor. There are no social services - even hospitals are threatened.

From Chocó, an area disputed by the guerrilla and para-military: Events in Bojoyá [the May 2 bombing death of more than 100 victims, including women and children, who had taken refuge in a church] affected all of us deeply. The worst of it is that no one knows why they became victims of violence. If we do nothing or if we do something the war comes to us. Afro-Colombians, who make up more than 30% of the population in Colombia, are disproportionately impacted by the war - 65% of the displaced are Afro-Colombian. Women too are affected by the worst aspects of war - our sons and daughters are forced to join the armed groups. When our men are killed or maimed it becomes our responsibility alone to care for the family and fight for survival.

From Arauca on the eastern border, a highly conflicted area: War never brings peace - only more war. We confront violence in the morning, at noon, and at night, but Jesus said, "Do not be afraid." Thirty-five churches have been closed and five pastors killed, the last one 12 days ago. He was 48 years old, taken out of the church and killed, leaving four children and his wife. Why attack evangelical churches? Because we do not participate in the war against the people. Since we do not support any of the armed actors, they attack us to force people to take sides. Because the people belong to our churches, the churches no longer have a choice about whether to be involved in the struggle.

From Villavicencio, part of the previously demilitarized zone: Every family in the zone has had a member recruited into the FARC or experienced assassination. Eighty churches have closed; only 4 are still open. But still we have a center for refuge, a place for boys and girls to recover who have been recruited into the armed conflict. We hand out Bibles to both the FARC and the paramilitaries. We have a farm where displaced people and marginalized families will be able to grow their own food.

From Sucre, a region disputed by guerrillas and paramilitaries: The civil population is caught in the middle of the conflict. Kidnapping and extortion are common occurrences. The economy is in shambles. Paramilitary forces use the strategy of killing indiscriminately rather than picking only the real targets in order to spread fear. Rural areas are abandoned because almost everyone has been moved off their land. The cities in the region can't support the displaced people. What is the church doing? Everything! We used to be busy in our churches doing churchy things, but now we must see the reality around us. We are a small church and thought we would open a little school for children of displaced families, maybe 15 or 20 children. On the first day we had 567 children! We cried for help. And help came, from the international community, and even from the government. The Roman Catholics also responded generously - [said with a wry smile] this was very hard for us evangelicals.

What emerges from these courageous stories is not a grand overall strategy for a peace campaign, but rather a commitment to follow whatever path and opportunity for peace-building the Holy Spirit makes known. In the words of those attending the Church Consultation, "The eyes of God are on Colombia." "The Holy Spirit has moved us out of our churches to respond to the brokenness in society." "As we gain experience we will develop action plans for a new response to housing, to the needs of children, and for returning displaced people to their communities. We are just beginning."

During the following week we spoke with many people in Colombia and had a variety of experiences in which we found signs of hope for peace, as well as obstacles in the path to peace that will have to be overcome. We confess that we found the task of finding signs of hope for peace in Colombia to be more challenging than identifying the obstacles.

Signs of Hope

The most obvious sign of hope for us was the enthusiasm and energy of those who work for peace. The only explanation we have for such enthusiasm and dedication in the midst of suffering and grief is that they have been infected by the Holy Spirit. What else has the power to sustain and to persuade others? We met an Afro-Colombian woman who became a peace activist during her days as a university student. She returned to her hometown and formed a women's network, a self-help organization that constantly struggles to pay its bills and support the women who need help. Another women told us that when she had returned after getting her accounting degree in the United States, she was asked to join the staff at this women's network. "Of course I said 'yes'. It's turned out to be a good job and when there is enough money I get paid."

This was a common theme. Mothers in a community of internally displaced families decided to start a school. There are four teachers, one of whom is certified, who have been running the school for a year. None of them have yet been paid. Workers for peace put the needs of the community ahead of a regular paycheck and ahead of their own safety. The strength of their witness and that of many others whose lives continue to be at risk in their organizing activities for the marginalized people of Colombia brings to mind the mystery of how persecution strengthens the Church. Surely this is a sign that we are not alone in the struggle for a lasting peace.

A second sign of hope for us was to be reminded again of the power of organization. While in Chocó we visited three communities in different stages of organization development. The first and most difficult visit was with the refugees from Bojoyá, the location of the May 2nd massacre in which more than 100 civilians were killed when the church in which they had taken refuge was bombed. More than 600 families were crowded into a very small area. They were still suffering from the trauma of the fighting and being uprooted from their homes and felt almost hopeless in a strange environment. "What can you do to help us?" they asked. "Please give us money or food. Please help."

The second visit was with a community of families displaced from the fighting at Rio Sucio eight years ago. These people had a community organization that apparently was receiving some aid at least from Spain, and was actively involved in trying to find work for its residents. A small group of these families were getting ready to return to Rio Sucio and try to rebuild their houses and small farms. This was a big risk to take, but they felt that it was the best they thing they could do for their community.

The third group we visited was at the headquarters of an indigenous people's organization. This is a group that has been organized for more than 20 years and has made successful legal claims to obtain collective ownership of tracts of their ancestral lands. They are connected to a national and international associations of indigenous people and have a clear understanding of their interests and the political setting in which they will need to advocate for their human rights.

For us, those three visits gave us a vision of a possible future for Colombia. The consequence of the present violence was fully revealed to us in the desperate pleas for help by the refugees from the Bojoyá massacre. In their traumatized situation they had no hope for the future. Feeling powerless, they could only imagine help from an outside source. Some years from now that community could be organized to obtain aid and to be working on ways to improve their situation, either by becoming part of the urban economy or by returning to their farms in rural areas. Twenty years from now that community could be part of the political process and participating in the movement to create an open political process and be part of an economy whose benefits extend to all.

Another sign of hope is the large number of organizations that are joining a national network of organizations working for peace. This is evidence that there is a broad constituency in Colombia with a desire to find a lasting solution to end the conflict. It is also heartening to hear that there is a new urgency and intention by many organizations to work in collaborative ways with others to end the violence. We were especially impressed with a diocesan spokesman who described to us their 10 point pastoral agenda to address the crisis being faced by civil society in their rural area, some of which are: • a fundamental option for life to overcome the denial of the right to life for blacks and indigenous people, • liberation theology - to put the church at the service of the people and promote the dignity of life, • accompany black and indigenous organizations in defense of human rights, • integrate with various expressions of black and indigenous culture, •women's liberation - reflect on issues of gender and defend basic rights for women, • establish social ministries to support rural community development work of other NGOs, promote economic opportunities, and strengthen community councils and other political structures being developed in the absence of official state political authority.

This articulation of the primacy of human rights for all people, expressed by the Catholic Church in one of Colombia's most under-developed departments, is not business as usual by the church that historically has been uninvolved with the conflict in Colombia. So it is indeed a sign of hope that the Roman Catholic Church has developed a clear understanding of the crisis they are facing and is organizing itself to be a constructive force for human dignity at all levels of Colombian society.

Obstacles in the Path to Peace

Peter Stucky, President of the Mennonite Church in Colombia, identified three of the major obstacles to peace in Colombia: "First, a lack of will by either political party to seriously negotiate. In four years there has been not a single reform proposed of the many that everyone knows have to occur as a condition for lasting peace. Second, political and government structures are unjust and exclusionary of the majority. Everyone knows this has to change. Third, and perhaps most important, is the simplistic attraction of a violent solution to ending conflict that seduces the powerful into thinking that necessary reforms can be postponed indefinitely."

Colombia, with assistance from the United States, appears to be poised to escalate the military offensive against the guerrillas. This will fulfill the campaign promise of President-elect Uribe to bring an end to the violence by forcing the FARC to come to the negotiating table when they realize they cannot achieve their goals by force.

The United States strongly supports Uribe and aims to stiffen the backbone of the Colombian government to stay the course. According to the Political Officer at the U.S. Embassy with whom we spoke, the pursuit of that policy is not without cost: "Things will get worse before they get better. It may take 20 years and many more innocent Colombians will lose their lives, but the FARC has demonstrated that they are not yet ready to negotiate."

Our critique is two-fold: first, even if it succeeds in bringing the FARC to negotiations - if something that takes 20 years and costs many innocent lives can be called a success - such negotiations are not likely not bring about a lasting peace. Negotiations that go beyond the terms of a ceasefire and deal with systemic injustices will require a large degree of trust that cannot be nurtured with weapons.

Secondly, the policy appears to us to be flawed in that it takes no account of the close relationship between the paramilitaries and the government's regular armed forces. Officials at the US Embassy recognize that there are connections between the regular army and the paramilitaries, but they stand by the State Department's certification that the Colombian government is distancing itself from the paramilitary forces and that the government is now doing better at prosecuting those responsible for human rights abuses.

This rather benign assessment of the relationship between the government and the paramilitaries is not shared by anyone else we spoke with in Colombia. This is not even a matter worth discussing, we were told; everyone knows that the actions of the paramilitaries are closely coordinated with the military. This was confirmed by a conversation we had with a government-appointed human rights officer in the Department of Chocó.

Human rights officers monitor situations in which constitutionally guaranteed human rights are violated or likely to be violated. It had become known that guerrilla fighters were gathering in large numbers near the confluence of the Boyojá and Atrato rivers. During the week before May 2 a series of three increasingly urgent warning calls were made asking for government forces to respond to an increasingly tense situation in the small town of Bella Vista. On May 2, in what has become known as the Bojoyá massacre, more than 100 civilians, including women and children were killed when a bomb destroyed the church they had taken refuge in. No response had been received to the urgent warnings during the week before May 2. On May 4, having heard reports of the massacre, he, along with a priest, a doctor, a journalist, and a photographer, set out by boat to assess the situation. He was able to negotiate with the FARC commander terms for treating wounded and evacuating survivors. The FARC admitted to throwing the bomb, but said it was a mistake; their target was a large group of the AUC near the church. From reports we had read, it appears that four or five hundred AUC arrived at Bella Vista in boats, having come up the river past a government navy station whose job it was to police the river, a well-known drug traffic route. "Doesn't this mean that the AUC and the government are working together," we asked. "How can 10 or 12 large motor boats filled with armed men go up the river, past the navy check point without their collaboration?" His response was less than revealing: "I cannot say there is a state policy that the military and the AUC work together." This was not a very satisfactory response to a situation that appeared to be pretty obvious to us. So we pressed him again. "I am a government employee", he said, "I cannot say there is a state policy that the military and the AUC work together. [pause] But I have thought about what happened that night and I will tell you that I have reached the same conclusion that you have reached." As a postscript, we can report that Army units arrived at Belle Vista on May 5. They assisted with the evacuation and remained for a few days before returning to their base in the neighboring department. The FARC are now back in control of the region.

We believe that there is no way that the United States can ensure that military aid to the Colombian government will not end up in the hands of the paramilitary forces and that paramilitary forces are linked to the most reactionary elements in the Colombian military and government, precisely those elements who will resist entering into the meaningful negotiations that are needed for a lasting peace.

Conclusion

Negotiations for a lasting peace require a minimial level of trust to be successful. This can be achieved in small ways, always looking for common ground on which on which to build trust. In the words of Ricardo Esquivia, the founding director of Justapaz, "Peace work is the work of the Church. We dream of a better life based on the Gospels, on God's own words. There is no force on earth that can make that dream die." Following that dream takes courage and solidarity: "To have courage is to not be overcome by fear. We need to see little pieces of hope in every action. As we work to strengthen the body of Christ in Colombia, so we also will strengthen the body of Christ in the United States. Ultimately we will end up working for the same issues in both countries."

The task facing the Colombian people is to overcome their legacy of violence and to rebuild civil society on relationships of trust rather than coercion. We are heartened by our visit to discover that there is a growing consensus that not only is this needed, but that it might be possible to achieve in a non-violent way. And we are impressed by the quality of the leadership of this growing movement. How can we, in North America participate in this exciting task of building a lasting peace in Colombia? Here is what a Red Cross official told us: "What we ask of the United States and the international community is to accompany civil society in helping the Colombian government remove the plugs from its ears and the blinders from its eyes so they will take on responsibility to protect civil society."

In response to what we heard from our dialogue partners in Colombia here is a list of specific commitments we have undertaken:

1. Strengthen the partnership between Justapaz and the United Church of Christ in Connecticut, support Justapaz's Ministry of Accompaniment, and explore with other members of the First Church in Windsor what it would mean to participate in Justapaz's Sister Church Program.
2. Work to restrict and eventually eliminate U.S. military aid to Colombia. Instead the Colombian government needs to be encouraged to adequately support the victims of violence and provide public services in rural areas that will help small farmers to stay on their land.
3. Work to end aerial fumigations of coca leaf. Evidence is that fumigation forces small farmers off the land because it destroys food crops in gardens as well as the coca. Colombians do want assistance in getting alternative crops to market, but they feel that destroying the livelihood and possibly the health of peasant farmers in Colombia cannot solve the United States' drug problem.
4. Work to channel humanitarian aid through the non-governmental organizations who have a commitment to assisting displaced people and other victims of human rights abuses in ways that strengthen community organizations.

July 25, 2002
Hugh and Kate McLean